

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 April 1982

Lieutenant General Glen W. Martin  
United States Air Force (Ret)

STAT

Dear General:

Thank you for the articles which you were kind enough to forward to me. You have caught me on my way out of town but, I have turned them over to the appropriate person here along with your letter. I hope things work out in your favor.

I enjoyed very much being with you in San Antonio and meeting you personally.

Sincerely yours,

STAT

Director, Office of External Affairs

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1 - D/OEXA Subject

1 - DD/OEXA

1 - C/PAD/OEXA

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1 - OEXA Chron

D/OEXA:JWD:jms (21 Apr 82)

GLEN W. MARTIN

14 April 1982

STAT

Director, External Affairs  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

STAT

Dear

STAT

It was a pleasure to meet you here when you gave us the word. I must say that your point on the KGB being able to sue the CIA was a grabber.

I'm enclosing a few of the columns I've written during the past year that I thought might be of interest to you. (At the same time I hesitate to do so because I recall well, during my thirteen years in Washington off and on, that they print it faster than one can read it.)

If you would be interested in running my column weekly I would be glad to meet the deadline.

Kind regards.

Sincerely,



Lt. General, USAF (Ret)

# Terrorism causes dilemma

San Antonio EXPRESS-NEWS — Saturday, May 2, 1981

In 1973, it was reported that Moammar Khadafy, president of Libya, had tried to buy an atomic bomb — presumably from China.

Fortunately, his offer was declined, but that was not the end of his search. Just how Khadafy's efforts will turn out is not yet known — at least by the Free World.

In theory, such actions by a head of state could be condoned under the cloak of national sovereignty, whether or not they were concurred in by other nations. Considering Libya's avid support of global terrorism for about 10 years, however, Khadafy's quest for nuclear weapons brings sharp focus on the potential impact of modern terrorism.

It has been seen that the cause of terrorism includes a spectrum of motivations ranging from a desperate effort for recognition to a fanatic dedication to ideology. In brief, that is why such actions are taken.

How terrorism is planned and supported, however, reflects a significant change in the scope of that type

of warfare. Terrorism has become a sub rosa form of organized aggression against the Free World. It is prepared in many training camps throughout the Communist world and supported by wealthy nations. One point to be emphasized is that terrorism is advancing hand in hand with technology.

The question is: What can be done to defend against it — or better yet, defeat it?

It has become clear after many years of outrage against humanity — the shootings, bombings, hijackings and hostage-capturings — that the circumstances of the crimes vary. This fact points toward the need for a national posture, as Professor Oscar Reischaffen of St. Mary's University explains, of "flexibility but firmness."

The first requirement is for a clear-cut center and channel of control. As an example: For at least a year after the Croatian dissidents' notorious hijacking of an airliner in 1976, it was estimated that 175 agencies and committees in the U.S. gov-



Glen W. Martin

ernment would be involved in case of a nuclear terror incident.

Fewer groups, but still a great many, would be involved in a major act of terrorism without the nuclear aspect. This poses a complex problem of control, but it is not necessarily unmanageable. Logical organization, clear procedures and frequent exercise of the system are called for.

The next need is for a skilled, trained force, police or military in nature, to meet the varying conditions of terrorism. The instigators may be any of three types: The criminal such as a bank robber who takes hostages; the psychopath; or the fervent revolutionary. An anti-terrorist force should be trained to cope with all types.

Success in countering terrorism, and even more in preventing it, is heavily dependent upon active and wide ranging intelligence collection. Coupled with intelligence must be a professional investigative activity.

It is here that some people believe that there could be an impingement on democracy and freedom. Although that apprehension may be valid in some countries under some circumstances, if carried far enough, it could raise doubts about maintaining any police force or military service. Most people recognize that it is an obligation of the government to protect the public.

The fact is that a democracy cannot go so far with restrictions and repressive measures as to sacrifice individual liberty. Accordingly, a free society must rely on public debate and the checks and balances in its constitution or charter.

Because there are practical limits to which counter-terrorist measures can be applied in an open society, that is probably one reason that the Free World is the preferred target in terror warfare.

Two more resources should be applied to the defense against terrorism. One is the great advantage of research and development in the technological environment of a modern industrial nation. The other is unified support of the public — not only in the United States but in the Free World.

Such public unity actually is fostered by the wave of indignation which follows each major terroristic event. If those attitudes were marshaled, they could provide the basis for an organized effort against terror as a weapon.

Such an effort should include a worldwide psychological campaign designed to disillusion and demoralize the individual terrorist. It has been demonstrated on many occasions that terrorists defect when they are convinced that their efforts are futile in gaining their objective.

There are other tactics, also proven, which could be carried out effectively if backed by a unified popular effort. Leadership is called for to direct and coordinate the solution.

# Terrorism and cataclysm

San Antonio EXPRESS-NEWS — Saturday, April 25, 1981

Every time there is a hijacking or a political kidnapping or murder, the nations of the world reconsider terrorism.

The victimized governments wonder if it will happen again. The others wonder if it can happen to them. It can and does at an increasing frequency.

Beyond the relatively routine capture of hostages for the purpose of ransom or escape, there are also wanton acts of senseless violence. These can occur as massacres in a jungle or as the bizarre "kneecapping" in the streets of major cities such as Rome.

The basic questions which responsible governments must ask are:

- Why do people carry out acts of terrorism?

- How are such actions planned, prepared and supported?

- What effective preventive or counteraction can be taken?

The strategy of terrorism is to gain power through fear. Destabilizing the established authority is the objective. The tactics are built around surprise

and boldness — to the point of reckless abandon, which can enhance the surprise.

Claiming credit for an act of heinous crime, and thereby achieving recognition leads to one of the factors in "why?"

Recognition is a key point. It attracts attention, sometimes worldwide, to a doctrine, a conflict, a cause, or even a person.

Although there is a difference between the average terrorist and the average assassin who is unaffiliated and acts on his own, there are some common denominators. One is the rampant compulsion for recognition.

Without attempting to draw a psychological profile of an irrational killer — irrational, that is, by civilized standards — it can be concluded that there are several other motivations which could be relevant in solving the problem.

Some experts have dealt with these characteristics at length. By way of summary and to set the stage for a possible solution, some of the major motivations should be described briefly.

Machismo is one. This is the fanatic



Glen W. Martin

excess of the "I can do anything," "Look at me" attitude.

Revenge is another. Basically feudal, this is "an eye for an eye" concept outside the law.

Greed can't be overlooked as a factor of terrorism, on the part of the individual and also any supporting institution.

Dedication to an ideology is perhaps the most compelling cause of terrorism. The overthrow of an existing government for reasons of real or the end which justifies the means. The ensuing deprivation of the rights, freedom and even the life of innocent victims is a contradiction ignored by the zealots.

Derangement is always a possibility whether caused by unbalanced

mentality or emotions. Sometimes such conditions evolve from drugs. In the latter case, the derangement can be of mass, mob or cult nature. It is probably pertinent in human history that the word "assassin" derives from a sect of hashish users in the Middle East about 900 years ago. They methodically liquidated their political enemies by murder.

Some of the foregoing reasons for terrorism suggests, not only "why," but "how."

In any single case of well-publicized group terrorism, arguments can be heard as to cause. The problem in El Salvador is a case in point. Knowledgeable students of the subject differ in their views of the cause of that terroristic activity. Some state that it is entirely local and internal, stemming from many years of government oppression.

Others document the case for a Communist surrogate chain, in the Salvadoran case, through Cuba, as the root cause. It is significant that U.S. government officials have stated flatly that there is evidence to that effect.

In her recent book, "The Terror

Network," Claire Sterling develops a documented and persuasive case for the deliberate establishment of a training and supply system in support of planned terroristic action.

Her conclusion, in essence, is that the Kremlin encourages and supplies the global reach of terrorism and that major training and operating activities are supported principally by Cubans, Libyans and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

It seems to be the case that terrorism rarely achieves its objective by itself, in spite of the agony it causes. Eventually, the suffering public tends to unify and launch counteraction which demoralizes and diminishes the terrorist effort, or occasionally creates the environment for a escalated military type of conflict.

Nevertheless, as modern weapons such as hand-held missile launchers, not to mention nuclear devices, become more available, terrorism can turn into a different ball game. It would be prudent for the Free World to analyze the "whys" and "hows" of terrorism as the basis for a solution before that happens.

# U.S. has fuel for 500 years

San Antonio EXPRESS-NEWS — Saturday, September 26, 1981

In these days of outrageous prices for oil and gas and of boycotting petroleum shipments to the United States — either experienced or threatened — a vast and secure source of energy sounds utopian.

It's true, nevertheless, and consists of uranium-238, already stored at three government sites in the United States. That nuclear fuel, if converted to use in breeder reactor power plants, could produce all of the generated electricity needs of the United States as projected for 500 years. To date, the breeder reactor is only experimental in the United States. All operating U.S. power plants are of the light water reactor type which is less efficient than the breeder type.

Such an energy source could be vital to the United States in view of the turmoil and vulnerability of the Middle East and its key oil resources.

Nuclear power has become a highly controversial subject over a period of some years. During that period, France, Britain, West Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union have moved ahead of the United States in

nuclear technology as applied to consumer power production by breeder reactor.

The same technology was demonstrated first in the United States in 1952. Since then, commercial development has been prevented by political sensitivity to two principal objections to nuclear power voiced by various minority groups and reflected as understandable doubts by some individual citizens.

The first objection was based on the question of safety of nuclear power and the second on disposal of radioactive waste. A third objection has related to the possible transformation of nuclear plant products to the weapons manufacture and thus, nuclear weapon proliferation. That, however, has been largely a government concern.

It is interesting to review the facts relating to each of the two main complaints.

On the question of safety, there is ample data for study, particularly since the accident at the Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania. Without getting into a welter of technical analysis, it can be said that the TMI accident resulted from a combination of equipment failure and human error.



Glen W. Martin

There were no fatalities and there is no reason, according to the nuclear experts, to expect any illness from radiation. That is in sharp contrast to the usual result when a major accident strikes a large component of the oil, gas or coal industries. Almost always there are fatalities, sometimes many.

The main reason for the difference in those types of accidents and the nuclear power related accident is the absence of an explosion or other sudden disaster in the latter. A reactor cannot explode like a bomb. Any accident about to happen would give warning and allow time for corrective action or evacuation and the results of the accident would be largely self-contained in the power plant. That was the case at Three Mile Island.

On the subject of radiation, the controversy has warped the perspective of potential hazard. As an example, living within 50 miles of a nuclear plant would expose a person to one unit (called a millirem), or less, of radiation in a year.

By contrast, based on innumerable studies by many scientists, engineers and doctors, the average exposure of a human being in one year is well over 100 units from natural background on earth. That includes radiation exposure from food, air, the ground, building materials and cosmic rays. Beyond natural radiation should be added man-made radiation from television, X-ray diagnosis, high altitude flight and other such activities. That total would add more than 60 units.

It can be seen, then, that daily living imposes on everyone at least 160 units of radiation per year, or more depending on where one lives. After the TMI accident, the maximum one-time exposure to any individual would have been 70 units.

Overall, one published comparison shows that the risk of death from being 30 percent overweight is 65,000 times higher than from nuclear power plant radiation.

On the question of the nuclear waste problem, it turns out to be relatively minor in comparison with the waste problems in most other types of power plants.

This is not to say that there are no dangers involved. No responsible scientist has claimed that nuclear power is 100 percent safe — there's no free lunch.

The waste from the average nuclear power plant, however, would fill only two filing cabinet drawers per year with high-level residue. That product can be processed safely, packaged securely for indefinite duration, and buried underground at depths and locations out of contamination reach of ground water.

It appears that the majority view on nuclear power may be coming from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union controls approximately 30 percent of the world's oil reserves, 40 percent of the natural gas and 50 percent of the coal. In spite of those impressive — and strategic — reserves, however, the Soviets have seen fit to build enough nuclear power capacity already to furnish 20 percent of their electric power generation.

# Enigma in Central America

It is not well-known that the United States and Nicaragua signed a treaty in 1914 which lasted nearly 60 years.

It is an interesting agreement because the United States was given the right to build a canal across Nicaragua connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Also granted to the United States, too protect the Panama Canal, which was opened in 1914, were two 99-year leases for the Corn Islands off Nicaragua's east coast and for a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca on Nicaragua's west coast.

In spite of these past relationships built on mutual interests and cooperation, the situation in Nicaragua is much different today; and that fact is quite well-known. Nicaragua has become the only continental springboard for communism in the Western Hemisphere. President James Monroe, of doctrine fame, is probably restless in his grave.

With Soviet weapons, including tanks and probably planes, shipped through Cuba, Nicaragua has the largest military force in Central America. The presence of Libyan and Palestinian, as well as Cuban and Soviet, military personnel, has been reported. Yasser Arafat has announced

the presence of Palestine Liberation Organization military people in both Nicaragua and El Salvador.

A similar trend is emerging in El Salvador. In 1822 El Salvador sent a representative to Washington to request statehood in the United States. That was done under the pressure of an invasion by an element of the Mexican army. El Salvador, however, wanted independence and freedom.

El Salvador today is beleaguered by leftist guerrillas supported by, and through, Nicaragua.

Today's situation illustrates two problems which have plagued Central American nations for several hundred years. One is the repeated threat posed by a neighboring country's arms or subversion. The other is the seemingly hopeless poverty of the people.

As a result, the world was seen a series of armed clashes, revolutions and coups throughout the region.

The difficulty, in many cases, has been that the leader of the aggression has been a freebooter rather than a dedicated patriot. It is hard to come by a George Washington or a Simon Bolivar.

In the United States, there is a crosscutting debate on assistance to El



Glen W. Martin

Salvador. This is caused in part by a congressional action last year which requires the president to certify that El Salvador is doing good with human rights before it can receive U.S. military assistance.

As long as that is the law, it must be followed.

A case can be made, however, that it is a faulty restriction which should be altered. It ignores the fact that, in every case, the imposition of communism on any people in the world has resulted in less individual freedom and civil liberty. Beyond that, communism has been enforced customarily by violence to the point of exiling, jailing and killing people by the thousands.

That can be seen today, not only in Poland, Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, but in Nicaragua, which is pretty close to home. What is the sense of withholding the aid needed

to prevent an inevitable degradation of human rights by a Communist takeover?

Soviet objectives in Central America are probably: One, to establish a Soviet-controlled base for further Communist expansion on the continent; two, to gain control over strategic resources and, in turn, isolate the United States from such resources (the same process is evident in Africa and the Middle East); three, by constructing a Soviet launch pad for communism in the Western Hemisphere, to provide a "feint faulx" which can be turned on to attract the world's attention at the onset of Soviet devilmint elsewhere.

On the plus side, the Organization of American States was formed and the Alliance for Progress proclaimed many years ago. These were deliberate steps toward unity and common progress.

In the charter of the OAS, Article 25 provides for concerted action in case the "territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of any American state is affected..." That principle has since been reaffirmed with specific reference to intervention by international communism.

There is, therefore, a long-standing basis for action against the leftist

militants in Central America if American states decide to take action.

It would seem that the main thrust of U.S. efforts should be, first, to continue the emergency actions to prevent the guerrilla fire from burning down the Salvadoran house; second, to unite efforts of those OAS member nations which choose to participate in coordinated action — political, economic and military — to block the shipment of military equipment to the guerrillas (the U.S. naval base at Fonseca Gulf, contemplated long ago, would come in handy today); three, to generate a major economic development program for El Salvador which could be extended to other Central American nations.

Private enterprise already has proved to be effective in Central America and the OAS Inter-American Bank, after some delay, has come forth with loans to El Salvador.

The World Bank Group can do more than it has done. Recently, for example, the World Bank announced an interest-free, 50-year loan of \$37 million to North Yemen to improve city living and education. These improvements would be welcome in El Salvador — perhaps even in Detroit.

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# Baron Khadafy's monster

San Antonio EXPRESS-NEWS — Saturday, October 31, 1981

In 19th century literature, Baron Frankenstein created an amoral and uncontrollable monster of great strength and destructive force.

During the past 10 years, Libya's Col. Moammar Khadafy has put together a neo-monster — the terrorist.

Terrorists were not invented by Khadafy. They go back far in recorded history. Since the word "assassin" was coined about nine centuries ago in the Middle East, the people of the world have been abused repeatedly by a variety of outlaws. The term "thug" came from bands of stranglers who robbed and murdered in India as far back as the 13th century.

In more modern times, a growing assortment of gangs and self-styled armies-for-a-cause, some national and others international, have defied authority with disruptive and senseless acts of violence against innocent human beings.

Without question, not all of today's acts of terrorism can be laid at Khadafy's doorstep. The documentation, however, of his substantial participa-

tion in training and supporting international terrorists, is extensive and persuasive. In addition to Libya, Syria and Cuba — and of course the Soviet Union — have been tied to that odious activity as well.

As a result, the world has a new problem. It is not new in terms of its nature, but rather, new as a sizable, organized and centrally supported capacity for lawless force. Terrorism is no longer limited to a drug-stoned assassin or a small band of thugs wandering in remote areas of one country.

Experts in the field have been quoted as saying that terrorism is replacing conventional war in some instances. This is a credible conclusion in light of various threats made by radical leaders from time to time.

Even more moderate leaders have acknowledged the potential of unconventional warfare as a government-supported defensive technique. President Gaafar Numeiri of Sudan announced recently that he was contemplating the training and deployment of commandos not only against the Libyan threat but Khadafy personally.

The threat to Sudan, including re-



Glen W. Martin

ported Libyan air attacks against several Sudanese towns near the Libyan border, brings into focus again the dangerous volatility of the Middle East. With each major event, the situation deteriorates.

There is no bastion of strength and stability in the area although there are some building blocks — five to be exact.

The most prominent possibility of longest standing is NATO, and specifically its southern region consisting of Italy, Greece and Turkey plus a U.S. presence. Since its organization 30 years ago, however, the region's strength has weakened. The French don't contribute any longer. British participation diminished with the independence of Malta. The Greeks and Turks came to swords' points over the Cyprus controversy. Sepa-

ately, Greece and Turkey have developed severe internal problems — the rise of the leftist influence in Greece and the wave of terrorism in Turkey.

The good news is that Spain's joining NATO looks promising at long last. This is a mark of progress rather than erosion. Spain is a relatively strong and independent nation with ties to Arab states, although not without terroristic problems of its own.

Second, Turkey has been a strong point of freedom since World War II. The Soviet Communist threat was perceived early in Turkey, largely because of the integrity and perspicacity of then President Ismet Inonu. After NATO's first blush, however, the steadfastness of the alliance faded. That was due in part to the zealous, but misguided, application of checks and balances by the U.S. Congress to foreign aid for Turkey.

Third, as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East, is the moderate bloc of Arab nations. For example, the record of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco, among others, is heartening. Although they have not come down

hard against terrorism or in favor of a free Israel, they have maintained a civilized attitude toward the world's problems of energy and peace.

Fourth, as a building block, is the triumph of the late president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat. The Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, which he initiated, has inspired the world — barring some fanatics — to hope for a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

Finally, Pakistan, although with its own dissident problems, may become a constructive element in the solution of the Middle East problem. The big plus is Pakistan's recognition of the implications of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. The minus is the continuing feud with India, which is far from being Pakistan's fault, but is a factor in blocking progress toward Middle East peace.

Cementing the building blocks for stability is the big job ahead. It appears that a new policy of containment, or preferably the defeat, of terrorism, which is the current manifestation of communism, is in order for the free nations of the world.

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# Reagan's strategic program

San Antonio EXPRESS-NEWS — Saturday, October 24, 1981

The president's vast program for modernizing U.S. strategic forces will be in the news for some time to come.

That will be good because an active debate should result. The strategic posture of the United States is the No. 1 issue of national security. It is an issue which the people should judge after considering the facts.

That was the purpose of the recent Defense Department publication on Soviet military strength — to make pertinent facts public. That is a remarkable document even though it has been criticized as brochuremanship in anti-defense circles and by the Soviet press. This is the first time that the hard evidence of satellite photography has been used as the basis for an all-encompassing, declassified record of Soviet military strength and build-up.

President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger have articulated the first comprehensive U.S. program for deterrence of the Soviets since the '50s — after an unbelievable 20 years of neglect and ostrichlike reaction by the U.S. government to a growing danger.

In explaining and justifying Reagan's program, Weinberger's logic has been impeccable. Unfortunately, logic is not always the hallmark of decisions and actions taken in Washington; major controversies over the program were precipitated before the ink was dry on the proposal.

It's worth examining the controversial points in the five-year \$180 billion strategic modernization program.

First is the well-publicized MX, or Missile Experimental, which is the program to update the intercontinental ballistic missile force. That program has been subjected to much study and review.

The studies have included consideration of putting the missile on roads, railroads, aircraft, ships, barges, submarines, and other submersibles as well as in trenches, tunnels, holes and shallow water. As might be expected, there are many advantages and disadvantages centering for the most part on accuracy, survivability and cost.

In spite of all of the analysts, there are still some unknowns. One is the question of accuracy of both U.S. and Soviet missiles under different conditions. The degree of accuracy has a



Glen W. Martin

direct effect on survivability and also on numbers of warheads needed to destroy a given target.

In that light, it seems to be a good idea to try out several modes of MX deployment, as Weinberger proposes. It is reasonable to assume that utilizing some portion of the 450 Titan and Minuteman silos, which are large enough to hold the MX, would provide the earliest start in modernizing the ICBM force — a significant point in view of the Soviet advantage in ICBM strength.

Trying other MX deployment methods would also have advantages. For example, the continuation of the airborne test program — preliminary tests were conducted successfully in 1974 — could contribute to diversification, or redundancy, which complicates the enemy's problem.

The next part of Reagan's strategic program to stir early controversy is the B-1 bomber to replace the 20-year-old B-52.

The main point is the need to sustain a credible Triad of strategic forces — the ICBM, the SLEM, or sea-launched ballistic, and the bomber. Credibility demands adequate modernization. Otherwise, doubts can be raised in the minds of both friend and enemy as to the real combat strength of each element of the force.

Some of the skeptics of the B-1 are not anti-defense people but rather those who favor waiting for the so-called Stealth bomber development because they think the B-1 may be obsolescent when it becomes operational.

The clear answer to that concern is that every weapon system in the world is obsolescent to some degree upon becoming operational — provided that research and development keep moving ahead. Any obsolescence of the B-1 would be far less than that of the B-52 today. Meanwhile, the "window of vulnerability" inches open further.

It makes sense to develop future bombers, Stealth included, but it

would be folly to skip the B-1. That lesson should have been learned as a result of losing years of modernizing the strategic forces because the B-1 program was stopped by the Carter administration. The bomber is the only battle proven weapon of the triad and it should be kept in fine tune.

The other main features of the president's strategic program include the development of the next generation of SLBM's — larger and more accurate — for the Trident submarine. Also included are an apparent increase in numbers of cruise missiles, an updating of aerospace defenses and an expansion of the near-dormant civil defenses. Some or all of these proposals will doubtless be subject to criticism sooner or later. Each deserves serious examination by the public in the light of the facts concerning the Soviet threat.

All of those proposals display the president's resolve to rebuild a credible deterrent posture. It can't be done overnight and it will be costly, but the official commitment to a substantial budget in support of strategic forces is, in itself, an element of determination and deterrence.

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